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The purpose of this thesis is to assess the threat that the North Korean Special 
Forces pose, and to explore how this threat might be deterred or countered. This thesis 
will answer three questions. First, in the event of a second Korean War, what will the 
special forces campaign look like? Second, how could one deter North Korea's use of 
this capability and, if that fails, can the threat be countered? Finally, what conclusions 
can be drawn from the North Korean case about the future use of special operations 
forces in general. 
This study provides an empirical assessment of the capabilities of the North Korean 
Special Purpose Forces and the threat they pose to the interests of both South Korea and 
the United States. It develops two possible campaign models, based on two prominent 
schools of thought on the use of special operations forces (SOF), autonomous use, or 
integration with general purpose forces. This thesis then compares the capabilities of the 
North Korean Special Purpose Forces to the alternate campaign models to predict their 
possible uses in the event of a second Korean War. 
Finally, the study addresses how the Republic of Korea and the United States may 
deter or counter the threat these forces pose. It also discusses what conclusions may be 
drawn from this study about the future use of special operations forces in general. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
Relative to other militaries, North Korea has an extremely 
large contingent of Special Purpose Forces.  Estimates of its 
size go as high as 100,000 men.  These Special Forces, and the 
doctrine governing their use, are among the least-understood 
aspects of the North Korean military.  Understanding the threat 
they pose, either in war or peacetime, on and off the Korean 
peninsula, is very important to the American and South Korean 
military planners. 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the threat that the 
North Korean Special Forces pose, and to explore how this threat 
might be deterred or countered.  This thesis will answer three 
general questions.  First, in the event of a second Korean War, 
what will the special forces campaign look like?  Second, how 
could one deter North Korea's use of this capability and, if that 
fails, can the threat be countered?  Finally, what conclusions 
can be drawn from the North Korean case about the future use of 
special operations forces in general. 
This study provides an empirical assessment of the 
capabilities of the North Korean Special Purpose Forces and the 
threat they pose to the interests of both the Republic of Korea 
and the United States.  It develops two possible campaign models, 
based on two prominent schools of thought on the use of special 
operations forces (SOF), autonomous use, or integration with 
general purpose forces. The "autonomist" model is a counter- 
vu 
leadership campaign developed from the recipe for a coup d'etat 
found in Edward Luttwak's book "Coup d'etat".  The 
"integrationist" model is an interdiction campaign developed from 
Soviet Spetsnaz doctrine.  This thesis then compares the 
capabilities of the North Korean Special Purpose Forces to the 
alternate campaign models to predict their possible uses in the 
event of a second Korean War. 
Finally, the study addresses how the Republic of Korea and 
the United States may deter or counter the threat these forces 
pose. It also discusses what conclusions may be drawn from this 
study about the future use of special operations forces in 
general. 
This thesis evaluates the capabilities and past record of 
these special purpose forces to show that they were designed to 
operate either autonomously or integrated into conventional 
operations.  However, political, military, and economic factors 
point toward North Korea using these special purpose forces 
generally along the lines of the "integrationist" campaign and 
not in a "autonomist" campaign. 
If the North decides to invade South Korea again, the 
strategy of the North Korean army is to fight a two-front war 
aimed at sweeping the peninsula in just 5-7 days.  The Special 
Purpose Forces play a significant role in this plan.  These 
forces would be used primarily to provide intelligence and create 
a second front in the South's rear area, in a campaign based on 
the "integrationist" model.  Their operations would commence 
viii 
prior to hostilities with special reconnaissance and sabotage 
missions.  Once hostilities commenced,these forces would be 
infiltrated in large numbers by air, land, and sea to conduct a 
wide range of special reconnaissance and direct action missions. 
Conventional deterrence theory works on simple cost/benefit 
analysis:  If the cost plus the risk is greater than the expected 
benefit, then deterrence is successful (if C + R > B, then 
peace).  If the cost plus the risk is less than the expected 
benefit, then deterrence will fail (if C + R < B, then conflict). 
To further refine this equation we add the probability of the 
different outcomes.  The probability of failing and therefore 
enduring the costs is inversely proportional to the probability 
of achieving the desired benefit. Therefore, if (P)(C + R) > 
(B)(1-P) then peace, and if (P)(C +R) < (B)(1-P), then conflict. 
This thesis suggests that the challenge to the U.S. and 
South Korea is to raise the costs and risks potential well above 
the benefits for North Korea, or to reduce the probability that 
the North will attain its desired result.  The South Korean 
response to this threat is simply to prepare for self defense.  A 
defense that is strong enough to deny the enemy's success will 
deter him. 
This thesis outlines possible U.S responses to this threat 
to maintain a credible deterrent, demonstrate our resolve, and 
yet remain unprovocative.  It suggests the possible succession 
crisis in the North may be an opportunity to open better channels 
of communications with North Korea to facilitate diplomacy. 
ix 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the Korean War armistice was signed in 1953, the North 
Koreans have prepared for another war.  At the same time, they 
have pursued alternative ways to continue the battle.  Time and 
again, the late Kim II Sung claimed to be the head of the only 
legitimate Korean government.  He said that it was his duty to 
reunify the Korean peninsula.  He went so far as to proclaim 1995 
as the "year of national reunification" and 1993 as the "year of 
final preparation for war."1  Since Kim II Sung's death, his son 
Kim Jong II has pledged to carry on his father's vision.  It is 
as yet uncertain how he intends to do this and if he will be able 
to reunify the Korean peninsula by force. 
Along with these provocative goals, North Korea has 
substantial military forces.  The North Korean military consists 
of an offensive-oriented army of over 1 million, a navy of 60,000 
(with over 500 naval vessels) and an Air Force of 80,000 (with 
over 800 jet combat aircraft).  This gives them the fifth largest 
military in the world.2  It is estimated that approximately 
100,000 of these are Special Forces troops, 20,000 of which are 
capable of infiltrating by air or sea simultaneously.3 
defense White Paper, 1993-1994, (Seoul, Korea: The Ministry 
of National Defense, The Republic of Korea, 1994), p. 54 
2Defense Intelligence Agency, North Korea, The Foundations of 
Military Strength, (Washington D.C., Government Printing Office, 
1991) p. iii 
3Defense White Paper, p. 62 
It must be noted that most of North Korea's military 
equipment is old.  The tanks are mostly 1950s era Warsaw pact 
models.4 The majority of their 800 jet aircraft are 1950s and 
1960s vintage Chinese and Soviet technology.5  Finally, their 500 
naval vessels are nearly all small patrol craft suitable only for 
coastal operations and not for major naval battles.6  Still, the 
very size of their military makes it a formidable threat. 
These Special Forces and the doctrine governing their use 
are some of the least-understood aspects of the North Korean 
military.  Their numbers make them one of the largest groups of 
specially trained soldiers in the world.  Understanding the 
threat they pose both during wartime and peacetime, on and off 
the Korean peninsula, is very important to the U.S. and South 
Korean military planners.  The U.S. has long standing treaty 
obligations with South Korea under the Korean-American Mutual 
Defense Treaty signed in 1953.7 
North Korean forces have conducted special operations 
against the Republic of Korea since the armistice ending the 
Korean War in 1953.  These operations cross the spectrum of 
potential unconventional military activities, from guerilla 
4Defense Intelligence Agency, p.40 
5Ibid., p. 47 
6Ibid., p. 44 
7Frederica M. Bunge, editor, South Korea: A Country Study, 
(Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1982), 
p. 192 
warfare to assassination attempts on the South Korean president. 
The operations have demonstrated a wide range of special 
operations capabilities: clandestine infiltration techniques; 
direct action operations; sabotage; and training of insurgency 
forces and terrorists. 
The overall size of the North Korean military gives them a 
significant numerical advantage over South Korea.  However, 
twenty years of rapid economic growth has enabled the south to 
surpass the north technologically.  South Korean defense 
expenditures grew from US$ 411 million in 1970 to over US$ 10 
billion in 1990.8  The resulting rapid modernization of the South 
Korean military far outpaced anything North Korea could afford. 
South Korea chose to balance against the power of the North 
by qualitative rather than quanitative means.  Traditional 
balance of power theory suggests that the highest risk of 
conflict is when the gap between the relative power of two 
countries is wide.9  However, power transition theory argues that 
war is most likely when a declining power nears the capabilities 
of a rising power or as this window of opportunity for the 
declining power closes.10  If power transition theory is right, 
North Korea's window of opportunity for attack is rapidly closing 
8Andrea Matles Savada and William Shaw, editors, South Korea: 
A Country Study, (Washington, D.C., Government Printing Office, 
1990), p. 293 
9Inis Claude, "The Balance of Power Revisited," Review of 
International Studies, 15: 77-85 (Great Britain, 1989), p. 79 
10Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1984), Pp. 44-49 
or may already be closed.  Thus, there exists a significant 
potential for conflict on the Korean peninsula.  Given North 
Korea's decline and South Korea's rise in power, the future 
prospects do not seem too promising for the North to be able to 
compete with the South, possibly encouraging the former to 
consider preventative war options. 
The purpose of this thesis is to assess the threat that the 
North Korean Special Forces pose and to explore how this threat 
might be deterred or countered.  This thesis will answer three 
general questions.  First, in the event of a second Korean War, 
what will the Special Forces Campaign look like?  Second, how do 
we deter North Korea's use of this capability and, if that fails, 
how do we counter this threat?  Finally, what conclusions can be 
drawn about the future use of Special Operations Forces in 
general from the North Korean case. 
Chapter II is an empirical assessment of the capabilities of 
the North Korean Special Purpose Forces and the threat they pose 
to the interests of both the Republic of Korea and the United 
States. To assess their capabilities, this chapter examines the 
pattern of Special Operations carried out by the North Koreans. 
Chapter III develops two possible campaign models based on 
two accepted schools of thought on the use of special operations 
forces (SOF), autonomous use or integration with general purpose 
forces.  There are two basic theories of the use of SOF.  The 
autonomous theory says SOF should be used for missions the 
General Purpose Forces (GPF) cannot do.  SOF operations are 
separate and distinct from those of the GPF.  The integration 
theory calls for SOF to be used in conjunction with GPF to 
improve the performance of the GPF. 
The "autonomist" model is based on the autonomous use of 
special operations to achieve strategic goals.  It outlines a 
counter-leadership campaign developed from the recipe for a coup 
d'etat found in Edward Luttwak's book "Coup d'etat".1X  Luttwak's 
book is a practical handbook for the strategy, planning and 
execution of a coup d'etat.  It outlines the critical targets 
necessary to pull off a coup.  The strategy and targets in this 
book are the basis for the potential unconventional warfare 
campaign that will be used to assess North Korean special 
operations capabilities and intentions. 
The "integrationist" model illustrates the integration of 
these special purpose forces in support of the general purpose 
forces on the operational level.  It is an interdiction campaign 
developed from Soviet Spetsnaz doctrine.  This doctrine is taken 
primarily from two books: "Inside Spetsnaz" by Major William H. 
Burgess III and "Special Operations and National Purpose" by Ross 
S. Kelly. 
These models represent two separate theories.  It is also 
possible that the probable campaign would be some hybrid of these 
two models. 
"Edward  Luttwak,  Coup  D'etat,  A  Practical  Handbook, 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1979) 
Chapter IV compares the capabilities of the North Korean 
Special Purpose Forces to the alternate campaign models to 
predict a possible campaign in the event of a second Korean War. 
This addresses the first question, what would a Special Forces 
campaign look like? 
The other two questions are answered in the final chapter. 
This chapter addresses how the Republic of Korea and the United 
States may deter or counter the threat these forces pose. It also 
discusses what conclusions may be drawn from this study about the 
future use of special operations forces in general. 
II. THE THREAT 
A.   BACKGROUND 
The foundations of the North Korean military are rooted 
firmly in unconventional warfare.  Kim 11 Sung developed the 
Korean Peoples Army from his experience in guerilla warfare 
against the Japanese.  In 1948, two years before the invasion 
that kicked off the Korean War, guerrillas from the north 
infiltrated into the mountainous region of South Korea.  The 
forces were able to keep four of South Korea's nine divisions 
occupied.12  These unconventional operations set the stage for 
the June 1950 conventional invasion of South Korea.  Only 
intervention by the United States and United Nations forces saved 
the South. 
Even before the ceasfire was signed in 1953 ending the 
fighting in the Korean War, the North began shifting from an open 
conventional conflict back to unconventional warfare.13 These 
covert operations are still going on today and are directed 
against South Korea and U.S. interests on the peninsula and 
throughout the world.  This mirrors with the development of the 
doctrine for the Korean Peoples Army of North Korea.(KPA).  Their 
doctrine is a peculiar mixture of Maoist principles of protracted 
12David Rees, editor, The Korean War: History and Tactics,(New 
York: Crescent Books, 1963), Pp. 11-13 
13Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., "North Korean Intelligence Agencies 
and Infiltration Operations", Jane's Intelligence Review, June 
1991, p. 269 
guerrilla warfare and heavy Soviet-style armored formations used 
in a blitzkrieg fashion. 
A constant thread throughout the post war-period has been 
the North Korean theory of "three revolutionary forces."  A 
strategy following this theory calls for first, a dynamic and 
powerful revolutionary base in North Korea.  Second, it calls for 
the establishment and support of a revolutionary force in South 
Korea.  Finally, this strategy aims to establish a support 
relationship with international revolutionary forces.14 
To carry out this unconventional warfare strategy, the North 
attempted to infiltrate small teams and individuals across the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) with the aim of recruiting agents and 
establishing subversive cells.  Throughout the 1950s and into the 
early 19 6 0s, the North Koreans continued this campaign.  These 
teams also performed espionage, reconnaissance, and other 
intelligence gathering functions.  For many reasons this campaign 
failed to gain any real support in South Korea.  It was not 
successful in its goal of establishing a revolutionary force in 
South Korea.  This failure prompted a Kim II Sung to raise the 
stakes and embark on a more aggressive and violent campaign 
designed to create what he called "the Peoples War within the 
Republic of Korea."15 
14Major Douglas S.  Watson,  "North Korean Special-Purpose 
Forces", Special Warfare, October 1992, p. 3 6 
15 Bermudez, p. 279 
In essence this became an-all out guerrilla war or as we now 
call it a low intensity conflict.  Two elite army units under the 
control of the Liaison Department of the Korean Workers Party, 
conducted this intense campaign.  They were the 124th Army Unit 
and the 283rd Army Unit.  Their operations reached a level never 
fully appreciated by the United States.  The operation peaked 
with an assassination attempt on the President of South Korea, 
Park Chung Hee, in January 1968 and with large scale commando 
raids on the east coast in October 1968.16 
This campaign also failed to generate Kim II Sung's 
"People's War."  Again, there were many reasons for this failure. 
The biggest of which was that the North Koreans failed to 
understand the situation in the South.  Many South Koreans may 
not have agreed totally with their government, but the average 
citizen was anti-communist and opposed to Kim II Sung.  South 
Koreans held this opinion for three reasons.  First, the people 
of South Korea had vivid memories of the war and remembered it 
was Kim II Sung and the communists who invaded in 1950.  Second, 
the south was enjoying a growing level of prosperity that was not 
matched in the north.  Finally, any support these guerrilla 
movements may have had was quickly destroyed by the harsh 
treatment handed out by the 124th and the 283rd Army Units.  For 
example, between October 3 0th and November 2nd, 1968, eight 
groups of 15 North Korean guerrillas from the 124th landed at 
nearly the same spot along the south coast. Their mission was to 
16 Bermudez, p. 169 
occupy and "revolutionize" small mountain villages. The intruders 
attempted to indoctrinate villagers and distribute counterfeit 
South Korean currency.  They ruled with fear and did not hesitate 
to kill villagers obedient to the government, labeling them as 
turncoats and reactionaries.17 Their failure led to the 
subsequent disbanding of both of these units. 
The failure of these two campaigns led to the adoption of a 
less violent strategy aimed at the long term infiltration and 
subversion of the Republic of Korea.  This new campaign 
continues. There are a few differences between this campaign and 
the effort to instigate a "peoples war."  First, it is focused on 
the long term and therefore is more deliberate.  Second, this 
campaign relies on specialized seaborne infiltration units and 
landing craft because of the South Korean and U.S. fortification 
of the DMZ.  Finally, this campaign is combined with a worldwide 
diplomatic and intelligence effort targeting U.S. and South 
Korean interests while simultaneously attempting to strengthen 
the North Korean claim to leadership of the entire peninsula. 
B.   ORGANIZATION AND CHAIN OF COMMAND 
The exact chain of command for the North Korean Special 
Forces is unclear.   Available information suggests a well- 
organized and equipped force that is hampered by multiple 
overlapping chains of command.  Some of this confusion was 
17The White Paper on the South/North Dialogue in Korea, (Seoul, 
Korea:National Unification Board, Republic of Korea, 1982) 
10 
cleared up with the revision of the socialist constitution of 
North Korea in 1992.18 
The revision of the constitution established a separate 
Defense Committee in the Korean Workers Party.  The Defense 
Committee exercises direct control of the Ministry of the 
People's Armed Forces (MPAF), the core of the North Korean 
military structure.  General policy, direction and strategic 
planning are formulated at the Defense Committee level and routed 
through the MPAF to the General Staff.  Operational command flows 
from the General Staff through its various bureaus and command 
headquarters, to the operational units (see Figure l).19  The 
Special Forces or as they are also called, Special Purpose 
Forces, fall under the control of the Light Infantry Instruction 
Guidance Bureau.  Within the armed forces, the VIII Special 
Purpose Corps provide all special-purpose units with 
administrative and technical support.  It also exercises 
peacetime control of all airborne light-infantry brigades, 
amphibious light-infantry brigades and those reconnaissance and 
light-infantry brigades not located within the forward corps 
areas.  During peacetime, the control of these forward units 
falls under the area commands where they are stationed.  However, 
during wartime, control of all these Special Forces units reverts 
back to the VIII Special Purpose Corps. 
"Defense White Paper, Pp. 56-57 
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The confusion about overlapping control occurs because 
additional administrative and technical support comes in varying 
degrees from the National Intelligence Committee, Cabinet 
Intelligence Committee, KWP-Liason Department and the General 
Staff Reconnaissance Bureau.  Additionally these units or 
elements of them will be subordinated to other headquarters for 
special missions. 
At the very top, the control of all the Special Forces and 
all the armed forces falls into the hands of Kim Jong-II.  He 
exercises this control as Supreme Commander of the Korean 
People's Party. 
The size of the North Korean Special Forces is generally 
held to be around 100,000 and accounts for 16% of the Korean 
People's Army.20  Figures vary, depending on the source, from 22 
light infantry brigades and 7 separate battalions21 to 27 light 
infantry brigades, 3 5 divisional battalions and 5 combined arms 
brigades.22 
The units are deployed throughout North Korea and organized 
into four general groupings: Brigades temporarily subordinate to 
the forward corps along the DMZ; Brigades directly subordinate to 
VIII Special Purpose Corps; Divisional light infantry battalions 
organic to each of the 3 5 infantry and mechanized infantry 
20Ibid., p. 59 
21Defense  Intelligence Agency,   p.   51 
22Watson,   p.   38 
13 
divisions; and the combined arms brigades subordinate directly to 
the General Staff.23 
North Korea classifies its special operations units as 
reconnaissance, light-infantry and sniper.  Reconnaissance and 
sniper elements operate in small team-sized units, while light 
infantry conduct combat operations similar to U.S. Rangers in 
company- and battalion-size elements.  There are four 
reconnaissance brigades specially trained to conduct covert and 
overt land sea and air operations.  These brigades are considered 
the elite of the Special Purpose Forces.  Each of them has a 
direct action unit that is employed for most covert operations. 
Kidnapping, hijacking, assassination, intelligence gathering, and 
special operations beyond the Korean peninsula are all part of 
the reconnaissance brigade's mission.24  These units carry out 
state terrorism for North Korea.25 
Additionally, nearly one quarter of the North Korean naval 
vessels are amphibious craft developed for the infiltration of 
these Special Purpose Forces.  These craft range from semi- 
submersibles to the modern hovercraft.  This represents a 
significant priority for the infiltration of these special 
operations forces.26 
23Ibid., p. 38 
24Ibid, Pp. 38-39 
25
"North Korea: Exporting Terrorism", Backgrounder, February, 
1988, p. 2 
26Bermudez, p. 275 
14 
In open sources, there is nothing that points to a unified 
command or naval and air force SOF structures that link the these 
special purpose forces with the necessary infiltration platforms 
in the North Korean Navy and Air Force.  However, some sort of 
structure is implied by the fact that one quarter of the navy and 
a significant portion of the air force is used for infiltration 
of these forces. 
C.   CAPABILITIES AND MISSIONS 
North Korea's Special Purpose Forces all possess certain 
ranger/commando or special forces-type capabilities.  The light 
infantry are roughly similar to U.S. Ranger units.  The 
reconnaissance and sniper elements are roughly similar to U.S. 
Special Forces.  All these Special Purpose Forces are comparable 
to the former Soviet Spetsnaz units.  It is likely that much of 
the training and equipment for these Special Purpose Forces was 
patterned after the Spetsnaz.27 
Their training for all these forces is primarily focused on 
operations behind enemy lines.  Emphasis is placed on the use 
initiative and political activities in South Korea both for war 
and during peacetime.  This training includes martial arts, 
demolitions, rigorous physical conditioning, mountain climbing, 
27Capt. Kenneth D. Denbow, Cdr. Thomas W. Finie, Col Jon M. 
Samuele, The North Korean Unconventional Warfare Threat to Planned 
ROK Mobilization and ROK and US Lines of Communication, (Washington 
D.C.,The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, April 1984), p. 13 
15 
map reading, swimming, parachuting, amphibious operations and 
even suicide attacks against buildings and military equipment.28 
This training gets them ready for their five basic missions: 
conducting reconnaissance, performing combat operations in 
concert with conventional forces, establishing a second front in 
the enemy's rear area, countering the South's special operations 
in their own rear area, and maintaining internal security.29 
These missions give most of these forces operational peacetime 
tasks as well as wartime missions. 
The first mission, reconnaissance, is conducted during 
peacetime to locate and/or identify critical targets in the 
enemy's rear area.  It is conducted during wartime mainly in 
support of conventional operations.  Conducting combat operations 
with conventional forces is done in a variety of ways.  Small 
team-sized elements can conduct sabotage and interdiction of 
lines of communication, logistics systems and military 
facilities.  These small elements are trained to disrupt and 
destroy key enemy assets such as command and control, 
communications, or nuclear and chemical assets. 
The third mission, establishing a second front in the 
enemy's rear area is both a peacetime and wartime mission.  In 
peacetime, it is focused on the establishment of a revolutionary 
force in South Korea.  This is consistent with the aforementioned 
theory of the three revolutionary forces.  These Special Purpose 
28Watson, p. 37 
"Defense Intelligence Agency, p. 51 
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Forces conduct unconventional-warfare operations in a covert 
manner in an attempt to build this revolutionary force.  In 
wartime, larger elements are infiltrated by air, land or sea to 
interdict reinforcements, seize or destroy major targets and to 
divert the enemy's power from the main battle area. 
There is less in the literature about countering the South's 
special operations and internal security.  It seems to make sense 
to counter enemy special operations with forces similarly 
trained.  In reality, the North's use of these forces to counter 
enemy special operations in their own rear area is a 
misapplication of these forces, which then become unavailable for 
offensive operations.  The North Korean general purpose forces 
working with the over five million homeland reserve forces are 
more than adequate to counter the South's special operations 
threat.30  The reason for the last mission, internal security, is 
that these forces are considered more reliable due to better 
screening and more political indoctrination. 
Most of these five basic missions depend on the capability 
to infiltrate into the enemy's rear area. These forces are all 
trained in varying degrees to infiltrate by land, sea, or from 
the air. The land infiltration capability is best evidenced by 
the extensive tunnel system believed to be dug under the DMZ. 
Since 1974, four tunnels have been found. It is estimated that 
there are an additional 2 0 more.31  Some of these tunnels are 
30Ibid., p. 55 
31Defense White  Paper,   p.   62 
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large enough to drive vehicles through.  This makes them high 
speed avenues of approach for larger light infantry units to 
infiltrate in the event of war.  There may be countless smaller 
tunnels that could be used to infiltrate reconnaissance teams or 
smaller attack teams.  Individual agents and small reconnaissance 
teams may also infiltrate on foot through the DMZ or by swimming 
the Han or Injin rivers.  This is a very risky operation because 
they usually must travel at night.  They must also avoid ambush, 
guard posts, patrols, obstacles, mine fields, villages and main 
roads. 
Seaborne infiltration capabilities are extensive.  Since 
South Korean and U.S. forces fortified the DMZ in the early 
1970s, the North Koreans have turned to seaborne infiltration as 
their primary means of entering South Korea during peacetime. 
They have designed and built a wide variety of craft to 
facilitate seaborne infiltration.  These craft range from mini- 
submarines to over 100 high-speed hovercraft, each capable of 
carrying platoon-sized forces for a surprise attack.  They have 
semi-submersibles and infiltration craft that look like 
legitimate fishing trawlers.  The KWP Central Committee also 
exercises control of at least eight ocean going cargo ships that 
can act as a "mother ship" for infiltration operations in South 
Korea, Japan, and other international operations.  One such ship, 
the Tong Gon Ae Guk-Ho, transported a Reconnaissance Brigade team 
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to Rangoon, Burma in 1983 for an assassination attempt on South 
Korean President Chun Doo Hwan.32 
The North has long made attempts to infiltrate agents and 
reconnaissance teams from these Special Purpose Forces into South 
Korea and Japan.  Some examples of this infiltration activity are 
the 1965 capture of ä mini-sub following its grounding on a mud 
flat at the confluence of the Injin and the Han rivers, the 
capture of a high speed infiltration craft after a high-speed 
chase off the northeast coast of South Korea in July 1979, the 
capture of a high-speed semi-submersible infiltration craft on 
the beach at Miji-ri in December 1980, and as recently as October 
1990, the wreckage of a North Korean infiltration craft washed 
ashore on the coast of Japan.  These efforts are continuing 
despite recent reunification talks and North Korea's attempt to 
improve relations with Japan.33  Seaborne infiltration obviously 
poses a threat that includes both peacetime and wartime 
operations. 
The third method of infiltration is more limited to wartime 
applications.  Airborne infiltration, because of the need to 
violate enemy airspace is usually limited to times of conflict. 
The north possesses at least eight airborne light-infantry 
brigades that are part of their Special Purpose Forces.  These 
airborne forces are supported by the North Korean Air Force's 250 
AN 2/Colt aircraft.  Some may think that these antiquated 1940s 
32Bermudez, p. 272 
33Ibid., Pp. 269-275 
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era aircraft have no place on the modern battlefield.  However, 
their slow cruising speed of 124 mph makes them particularly 
suitable for flying through mountain passes and down valleys to 
pass under the radar in the rugged mountainous terrain that is 
predominate in the central region of Korea.  On the other hand, 
this slow speed makes them very vulnerable once the are detected. 
This airborne capability was enhanced significantly in 1984 by 
the clandestine acquisition of 80+ U.S. made Hughes 500 C and D 
model helicopters.  They were smuggled into North Korea by a West 
German sales representative.  Until this delivery, the North 
Koreans had only a very limited number of Soviet made MI-4/Hound 
and MI-/Hip helicopters in their inventory.34 
Additionally, North Korean Special Purpose Forces are 
engaged in the conduct of terrorism, as well as the training of 
terrorists in camps within North Korea and abroad.  There is a 
long history of the use of terror tactics by the North Koreans. 
In 1968, 31 North Korean commandos attacked the Blue House, the 
presidential compound near Seoul, in an attempt to assassinate 
the South Korean president.  In another incident, a bomb was 
placed by three terrorists later identified as a major and two 
captains in the North Korean Special Purpose Forces, in Rangoon, 
Burma.  It was another attempt to assassinate a South Korean 
president.  Another example of the North's use of terrorism is 
34G. Jacobs, "North Korea Looks South: Unconventional Warfare 
Forces", Asian Defense Journal, December 1985, pp. 10-23 
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the bombing of a Korean Airlines Flight 858 killing 115 
passengers and crew in 1987.35 
These examples are only a sample of the terrorist acts that 
can be attributed to the North Koreans.  They suggest, not just 
state sponsorship of terrorism like Libya and the former Soviet 
Union, but state-directed terrorism.  State sponsorship of 
terrorism involves supporting others so they can carry out 
terrorist acts that may be in the sponsor's interests.   State- 
directed terrorism is the direct control of the terrorists by a 
state or a state conducting terrorist acts with their own forces, 
as in North Korea's case.  North Korea may very well be the first 
true terrorist state.  The government of North Korea appears to 
be committed to the use of terrorism as an acceptable means of 
pursuing national policy.  This national policy is rooted in Kim 
11 Sung's theory of three revolutions and Article 16 of the North 
Korean constitution that calls for the unity with "all the people 
of the world opposed to imperialism" and the support of the 
"struggle for national liberation and international 
revolution. "36 
Evidence indicates that an estimated 7 000 North Korean 
Special Purpose Forces have traveled to 47 countries to train 
terrorists and guerrillas and that an additional 5000 terrorists 
from 25 countries have received training in camps inside North 
Korea.  There is also evidence to suggest that North Koreans are 
35Watson,   p.   3 8 
36Ibid.,   p.   39 
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allied with such groups as Italy's Red Brigades, Germany's Red 
Army Faction, the Japanese Red Army and the Palestine Liberation 
Organization.37 
D.   OPERATIONS 
The operations of these special purpose forces cover a wide 
spectrum, from terrorism to guerrilla warfare.  There have been 
at least five assassination attempts on South Korean presidents 
by the North, and since 1965 these have been more than 70 
incidents on the DMZ and over 40 South Korean fishing boats were 
seized.  These operations also include kidnapping, bombings, 
murder, and other terror tactics. 
The research for this thesis has revealed few details of 
North Korean special operations prior to 1965.  However, sources 
point out the types of operations North Korean forces carried out 
from 1953 to 1965.  There is much more detailed data for North 
Korean provocation since 1965.  The Appendix is a chronology of 
North Korean operations from 1965 through 1992 compiled from 
multiple sources. 
These operations can be separated into three phases.  These 
phases are not totally distinct from each other.  They tend to 
blend together over time, however there seems to be three 
distinct strategies.  First, from before the armistice was signed 
until the mid-seventies, North Korean special purpose forces 
carried out a guerrilla campaign in an attempt to stimulate and 
organize a revolutionary force in South Korea.  Second, beginning 
37Ibid, p. 39 
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with an assassination attempt, the Blue House raid in 1968 
through the eighties, the strategy shifted to terror tactics and 
attempts to decapitate the South Korean government.  Finally, 
from the late eighties through the present, the operations have 
shifted to a less violent strategy of infiltration through a 




III.  CAMPAIGN MODELS 
A.   THE "AUTONOMIST" OR COUNTER-LEADERSHIP MODEL 
This model is developed on the hypothesis that a Counter- 
leadership campaign aimed at South Korea would look very much 
like a coup d'etat.  The strategy and execution of this counter- 
leadership campaign may be the same up to the point of seizing 
power.  Here lies the major difference between a coup and this 
"autonomist" model.  The goal of a coup d'etat is to seize power, 
while the goal of a counter-leadership campaign is to bring down 
the existing regime.  The reason behind this sort of campaign may 
be to create a power vacuum and install a leadership from within 
the present system more favorable to one's interests or it may be 
to destroy a country's leadership to facilitate an invasion. 
Either way, the strategy of a coup or a counter-leadership 
campaign remains very similar. 
1.   Strategy 
Overthrowing a government is not easy.  Most all governments 
are protected by professional security forces (armed forces, 
police, security agencies) and are supported by a whole range of 
political forces.  Therefore, the strategy to overthrow a 
government must aim to decapitate the existing leadership, 
neutralize security forces, and pacify political forces.38 
a. Decapitation 
Immediate political power is always concentrated in the 
country's government.  The strategy for a counter-leadership 
38Luttwak,   p.   57 
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campaign or coup must address how to eliminate or isolate this 
formal political power.  This is but the tip of the iceberg.  It 
may appear that those who carry out a coup shatter a powerful 
structure merely by seizing a few buildings, arresting or killing 
of a few political figures and liberating the radio station.  In 
reality, their primary achievement has gone unnoticed.  The real 
achievement is the process by which the security forces are 
neutralized and the political forces are at least pacified 
temporarily.39 
b.       Neutralize Security Forces 
Edward Luttwak points out that one common feature of 
modern states is extensive and diversified security systems.  In 
nearly every state, the security system consists of the armed 
forces, the police, and some form of intelligence organization. 
South Korea is no exception.  It has a modern powerful military, 
the Korean National Police and the Agency for National Security 
Planning (ANSP) .40 
Because of their capability for direct intervention, 
these security forces must be neutralized before the actual 
military operation to bring down the government in South Korea 
takes place.  In order for North Korean Special Purpose forces to 
neutralize these forces, different strategies need to be taken 
for each. 
39Ibid., Pp. 57-58 
40Savada and Shaw, p. 310 
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(1)  Military.  The increase in the size of modern 
uniformed forces and the technological revolution have made 
modern armies vulnerable to infiltration and recruitment by 
subversive forces.  The modern army is usually too large to be a 
coherent social unit bound by traditional loyalties.  This size 
and the need for technologically-minded personnel has broken down 
the traditional barriers that limited recruitment to particular 
social groups.41 
This vulnerability gives a subversive force (North 
Korean special purpose forces) the opportunity to infiltrate the 
system and turn a few of the component units into active 
participants of the coup, while neutralizing the others.  In this 
way, the small subversive element may overthrow a government 
before anyone realizes how weak they are. 
To carry out this campaign, the subversive forces 
must evaluate the armed forces of the proposed target state 
completely.  First, these forces must identify the real 
operational echelon in the various armed forces in the target 
country. Armies have a formal command structure made up of 
divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies and 
platoons, however, the real chain of command may not follow that 
same structure.  For example, in a centralized command and 
control structure where battalions are controlled directly by the 
General Headquarters (GHQ), subverting the levels between the 
battalions and GHQ is a waste of time.  On the other hand, in a 
41Luttwak, p. 63 
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de-centralized command structure where almost every echelon is 
operational, subversion at any level is desirable.42 
Once the operational level of the command is 
determined, the next step to identify the forces relevant to the 
coup or the counter-leadership campaign.  Luttwak suggests that 
the forces relevant to the operation are those whose location 
and/or equipment enables them to intervene with the operation 
within 12-24 hours of the actual takeover.  This is his estimate 
of how long it takes to establish control over the machinery of 
government.43 
Now, that the subversive forces have identified 
the nature, composition and the real operational echelon in each 
relevant unit, they must identify key individuals within those 
units.  These key individuals fall into two categories, the 
leaders and the technicians.  The leaders are usually the 
operational officers of the relevant units.  The task remains to 
identify key technicians who can affect the operations of the 
relevant units to prevent their intervention in the coup or 
counter-leadership campaign.  These technicians may be the 
communications staff that transmits or receives communications 
between political leaders and the relevant unit, or any other 
technicians who are necessary for the unit to operate.  The 
cooperation of technicians is sufficient for neutralizing a unit; 
but, in order to incorporate a unit into an active participant, 
42Ibid., Pp. 66-68 
43Ibid., p. 70 
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the operation will need the active cooperation of a number of the 
leaders of that unit. 
Before the planners go on to approach and persuade 
these key individuals, they must collect sufficient intelligence 
to know which are the relevant units, the real command structure 
and the leaders of relevant units, and the technical structure 
and relevant technicians in these units.44 
Once identified these key individuals must be 
evaluated in terms of their likely reaction to potential 
recruitment.  Luttwak gives us three guides as to the value of a 
potential recruit: ethnic affiliation, political outlook and 
career patterns.  Ethnic affiliation is relatively easy to 
assess.  Assessing political outlook is somewhat harder and 
hardest of all is finding out if the recruit is alienated from 
his superiors.  This can be assessed by following his career 
pattern.  This all requires extensive intelligence collection.45 
Once the approach and persuasion of key 
individuals begins to give results, the units that can be 
incorporated as active participants in the overthrow of the 
government are identified.  The focus then turns to neutralizing 
the rest of the relevant units. 
(2)  Police.  The structure of police in modern 
societies is diverse.  Police forces are shaped by social and 
political conditions in the country they serve.  However, no 
44Ibid., p. 72 
45Ibid., p. 80 
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matter how diverse, they resemble each other in the purposes they 
serve, the detection and prevention of crime and the maintenance 
of public order.  The maintenance of public order is either 
carried out by separate para-military element or by concentrating 
ordinary policemen taken from other duties.  The criminal side of 
police work is carried out by a country-wide network of police 
stations.  This network may or may not be under national command. 
Often, the police include an intelligence element.46 
The strategy of the coup must be as diversified as 
the police system it faces.  In South Korea, the police are 
organized into a national police force, the Korean National 
Police (KNP).  This force is composed of thirteen 
metropolitan/provincial police bureaus, the combat police (para- 
military element), the National Maritime Police and an anti- 
*-";•:••■ __st unit.  Their missions include regular police functions 
as law enforcement, criminal investigations, and public 
safety.  In addition to these, the KNP are responsible for the 
maintenance of public order (riot control, countering 
demonstrations), coastal security, anti-smuggling operations and 
even counter-espionage operations with the military.  The KNP 
also conduct "combat operations" against small scale 
infiltrations attempts, monitor foreign students and other 
"security" risks, and conduct anticommunist and counter-terrorist 
46Ibid., p. 90 
30 
operations.  Nearly one half of the more than 130,000 man KNP is 
organized into para-military units.47 
Luttwak suggests that the only real threat posed 
by the police is from the para-military forces.  He points out 
that the forces used to carry out criminal police work are not 
equipped and trained to intervene in a timely manner against 
armed opponents in a major political crisis.48 
To neutralize the para-military element of the 
KNP, the subversive forces must evaluate it thoroughly.  The 
first step is to establish the size, deployment and organization 
of these para-military forces.  Next, the planners of the coup- 
like campaign will assess the degree of attachment to the present 
regime of these forces.  If the equipment, deployment and 
mentality of the para-military forces is such to make them an 
effective intervention force, as in South Korea, they must be 
dealt with in one of two ways.  First, the whole process of 
infiltration and subversion taken with the military could be 
repeated or the incorporated military units could be used to 
isolate the relevant para-military forces. 
(3)  Security Agencies.  The security agencies are 
probably the smallest organizations involved in the professional 
defenses of the state.  However, they are also the most 
dangerous.  These forces are actively trying to identify and 
defeat threats to the state.  These agencies, whether they belong 
47Savada and Shaw, p. 318 
48Luttwak, Pp. 98-99 
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to the police, the military or are separate organizations, are 
difficult to study from the outside and sometimes even unknown to 
foreigners.49 
The three main South Korean security agencies are 
the Agency for National Security Planning (ANSP), the Defense 
Security Command (DSC), and elements of the KNP.  The function of 
these agencies often overlap.  Additionally, they have 
historically wielded a disproportionate amount of power because 
of the continued threat from the north.  Until recently, these 
agencies have enjoyed nearly unlimited powers to investigate and 
detain any person accused of anti-state behavior.50 
The powers that these security agencies hold 
dictates that the strategy used to neutralize them be purely 
defensive, unless the subversive forces have a direct line to one 
of these agencies.  If this is the case, the security agency 
concerned would provide an ideal cover for subversive activities. 
Barring such a situation, the strategy will be one of avoiding 
contact with these agencies and following a few basic rules to 
minimize any security compromises for the whole operation.  These 
rules include: a) all information be verbal; b) information be 
communicated on a "need to know" basis only; c) communication 
links be one way only; and d) no activity be carried out by a 
core planner that can be carried out by a recruit.51 
49Ibid., p. 99 
50Savada  and Shaw,,   Pp.   310-323 
51Luttwak,   Pp.   102-103 
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c.       Neutralize Political  Forces. 
As with the security forces, the first step to 
neutralizing the political forces is conducting a thorough 
analysis to identify the important forces in the political arena. 
Immediate political power is concentrated in the formal 
government of any country, but there are also personalities and 
groups outside the government that have significant political 
power.  The source of strength is their ability to participate in 
the formation of governments and their ability to influence 
political decisions.  Political forces can intervene against the 
coup in two ways: they can rally the masses or loyalist forces 
against the subversive forces; or they can manipulate technical 
facilities under their control to oppose the consolidation of 
power after the actual coup.52 
Politics, like industry has an infrastructure. 
Political mobilization of direct political action requires 
certain technical facilities.  These facilities include the mass 
media and telecommunications and public and private 
transportation.  Formal governmental institutions are also part 
of this infrastructure. 
In general, the strategy for neutralizing the political 
forces is to attack and control this infrastructure.  However, 
some political forces are resilient enough to intervene even 
52Ibid., Pp. 107-109 
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though the infrastructure has been neutralized.  These forces 
will have to be targeted separately.53 
(1) Personalities within the government.  A 
through analysis identifies the real government as opposed to the 
formal one.  Government personalities should be classified into 
three categories.  First there are the Ceremonial Figures.  These 
positions hold little real power in the government and can 
usually be controlled once the real power is seized.  These 
personalities can be either ignored or controlled.  Next, The 
"inner council" or the real power brokers in South Korea must be 
arrested or killed outright.  These individuals hold the real 
power.  In South Korea, this would include at the minimum, the 
president, the prime minister, the ministers of home affairs, and 
defense and the director of the A.N.S.P.54  This category should 
also include any other government leader who is personally 
popular among the masses.  The third category is the other 
ministers and top civil servants.  This group should be 
prioritized so that they can be dealt with appropriately as the 
new government consolidates its power.55 
(2) Personalities outside the government. 
Normally the political clout of an individual outside the 
government is defined by his importance as the head of some 
organization or group.  Treat these personalities as ceremonial 
53Ibid., Pp. 110-111 
54Savada and Shaw, p. 2 06 
55Luttwak, p. 117 
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figures and neutralize the group or organization by attacking the 
infrastructure. 
(3)  Particular Groups.  Luttwak suggests three 
types of organized groups that may be strong enough to oppose the 
overthrow of the government even if the government is silent, 
religious organizations, political parties and trade unions. 
These groups can normally be neutralized by controlling the 
infrastructure needed to mobilize opposition to the coup.56 
In South Korea religious groups are too diverse to 
hold significant political power.  Political parties are 
generally conservative and lack the expertise for mass agitation. 
Trade unions are required by law to be affiliated with one of 
seventeen government sponsored unions and with the Federation of 
Korean Trade Unions (FKTU).  These groups do not pose a 
significant threat to the operation.57 
2.  Execution of the Campaign 
a.   Necessary Conditions for Success 
The necessary conditions for success of an autonomous 
campaign are; detailed planning, speed of execution, timing and 
security.58 
(1)  Detailed Planning.  The complexity of this 
campaign makes detailed planning a must.  The actual execution of 
56Savada and Shaw, p. 12 8 
57Luttwak, Pp. 147-155 
Ibid., Pp. 146-157 
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an autonomous operation will be conducted without conventional 
support by small units. 
(3) Speed of Execution.  Like a coup, the active 
phase of this campaign is based on the precise application of 
force to strike at the organizational heart of South Korea.  The 
key to success is having the smaller forces of this campaign 
achieve local superiority over the larger South Korean Government 
forces.  To achieve this local superiority, speed is essential. 
The whole idea of the counter-leadership campaign is to be able 
to present a fait accompli before the forces loyal to the 
government can rally to suppress it. 
(4) Timing.  Timing is crucial for success 
because of the need to hit so many targets simultaneously. 
Failure to neutralize even one important force may mean failure 
for the entire operation. 
(5) Security.  Every move made by subversive 
forces can generate information which could reveal the entire 
operation to the security agencies.  For this reason, the 
security measures mentioned earlier are vital to the success of 
the campaign.  The sheer magnitude of this type of operation 
requires either large numbers of agents infiltrate into South 
Korea or an extremely effective subversion effort.  Either way, 
the number of people involved would be quite large, inreasing the 
risk of a security leak. 
36 
b.        Physical   Targets.59 
In addition to targeting personalities within the 
South, there are a number of physical targets that are important 
to the "autonomist" campaign. 
(1) Mass Media,  The control of information 
flowing from the political center is crucial.  The goal is not 
just to control the information flow but to monopolize it. 
Because of the immediacy of radio and television, they are the 
priority targets.  It would be practically impossible to seize 
all radio and television broadcasting facilities in South Korea. 
Therefore, the objective is to seize and hold the facility most 
identified with the voice of authority and neutralize the others. 
(2) Telecommunications.  Modern Governments rely 
heavily on fixed communications.  By targeting communication 
nodes, the North Korean forces could paralyze the South Korean 
government reaction and prevent the government from deploying 
forces they still control.  As it is not easy to infiltrate 
forces in the entire national territory, the North's forces would 
attack  the mechanisms that could lead to the arrival of loyalist 
forces.  Loyalist forces are not much of a threat if they can't 
be called in to intervene.  There is no need to seize these 
facilities.  Sabotage, either internal or external, is preferred. 
(3) Transportation.  During the active phase of 
the operation, the arrival of even a small contingent of loyalist 
forces or forces that have not been infiltrated may endanger the 
59Ibid., Pp. 118-130 
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entire operation.  Major avenues of approach -- roads, railroads, 
subways, and airports -- need to be neutralized.  To accomplish 
this, road-blocks are set up to control entry and exit into the 
capital city, setting up a perimeter around the center of 
political and bureaucratic activity.  Airports, railroads and 
even the subways in Seoul also must be controlled to prevent 
reinforcements from loyalist forces. 
(4)  Public Buildings.  Aside from the buildings 
that represent other targets, certain public buildings represent 
the power of the state.  These buildings should be targeted to 
give visual evidence of the downfall of the government. 
Therefore, targets should include the seat of effective political 
power, the Blue House in South Korea; the main administration 
buildings, e.g. the combined government and ministerial building 
in Seoul; and other buildings that may represent governmental 
power in a purely symbolic sense. 
B.   THE "INTEGRATIONIST" OR INTERDICTION MODEL 
1.   Strategy 
The strategy for the "integrationist" model is based on the 
former Soviet concept of creating a second "front in the enemy's 
rear."60  Soviet doctrine states that, Special operations forces 
can be used across the spectrum of conflict to: 1) "decapitate " 
decision makers by elimination, incapacitation, or capture; 2) 
delay, deceive, and disorganize forces in reserve; 3) locate and 
60Major William H. Burgess III, editor, Inside Spetsnaz, Soviet 
Special Operations, A Critical Analysis, (Novato, Ca. : Presidio 
Press, 1990) p. 211 
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neutralize special weapons, delivery systems and weapon storage 
sites; 4) seize and control key terrain; 5) disrupt command 
control and communications (C3); and 6) otherwise exploit 
operational and strategic success.61 
The deep operation was fundamental to Soviet perception of 
combined arms operations and battle.  Soviet doctrine for deep 
operations entails the integration of a number of separate but 
interrelated operations to achieve simultaneous neutralization of 
the enemy's defenses through the entire depth of the battlefield. 
This doctrine calls for the rapid breakthrough of the enemy's 
tactical zones of defense along the main sector of attack. 
Soviet doctrine also reinforces success with rapid deployment of 
reserves to exploit tactical successes and turn them into 
Operational successes.  Airborne and Air assault forces are used 
to increase the tempo of the operation.62 
Rather than having a separate special operations doctrine, 
the Soviets viewed special operations as a subset of deep 
operations.  Special operations becomes a force multiplier to 
improve the odds for victory by conventional forces.63 
A special operations campaign based on Soviet tactics and 
doctrine would be waged primarily to assist general purpose 
forces.  SOF would use their capabilities to delay, deceive, 
61US Army Field Manual 100-2-2, The Soviet Army, Specialized 
Warfare and Rear Area Support,  (Washington D.C.: Headquarters, 
Department of the Army, 16 July 1984) Pp. 5.1-5.2 
62Burgess, p. 225 
"Ibid., p. 226 
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disorganize, and otherwise disrupt the enemy. These forces act as 
"force multipliers" by diverting enemy attention and additional 
combat power from the main conventional attack.64 
2.   Missions 
In mid- and high-intensity conflicts, the focus of these 
special operations forces would be on special reconnaissance and 
direct action missions.  The special reconnaissance would provide 
tactical and strategic intelligence.  Direct action missions 
would be used to decapitate decision makers, interdict, delay and 
disorganize forces in reserve, neutralize special weapons and 
weapons stockpiles, interdict lines of communications, control 
bottlenecks, disrupt communications, and otherwise expedite 
breakthroughs by the general purpose forces.  The North Korean 
Special Purpose Forces, like the old Soviet establishment is 
large enough to remain effective after the severe losses that can 
be expected while operating behind hostile lines.65 
a.   Special Reconnaissance 
Special reconnaissance missions would be initiated 
prior to hostilities, most likely through covert infiltration of 
agents from a third country.  The focus of these reconnaissance 
missions would be to provide intelligence on the U.S and South 
Korean order of battle to assess the location, strength and 
disposition of these units.  These pre-hostility missions could 
64John M. Collins, Green Berets Seals and Spetsnaz, U.S and 
Soviet Special Military Operations, (Melean, Va.: Perganon- 
Brassey's International Defense Publishers, 1988), p. 75 
65Ibid., Pp. 62-63 
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also conduct target acquisition of critical facilities and 
personnel.  Once hostilities begin, North Korean Special purpose 
forces would provide direct tactical intelligence for supported 
units as well as strategic intelligence.  It is unlikely that 
these forces would conduct mass infiltrations of South Korea just 
prior to hostilities as this could compromise the upcoming 
invasion.  However, once hostilities begin, large numbers of 
these special forces can be infiltrated by land, sea, and air to 
conduct direct action missions as well as continuing special 
reconnaissance.66 
b.       Direct Action 
Direct action missions for this model run a wide 
spectrum. However Soviet doctrine suggests that the priorities 
would be on missions such as assassination, sabotage, raids, and 
ambushes.67  These missions are conducted at the tactical level 
through the strategic level. 
Special purpose forces would conduct assassination 
missions to decapitate key military and political decision makers 
just prior to or upon initiation of hostilities.  The Soviets and 
North Koreans both have histories that show no reluctance to 
using assassination as a tool to disrupt enemy forces.  Soviet 
Spetsnaz were responsible for the assassination of Afghanistan's 
President Amin; and North Korean forces have made at least five 
attempts on the lives of South Korean presidents. 
"Burgess, p. 252 
"Collins, p. 7 
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In an "integrationist" campaign based on Soviet 
doctrine, all operations are based on the main effort.68  These 
special operations forces conduct ambushes to prevent enemy- 
forces from reinforcing the weak points enabling the North's 
conventional forces to breakthrough.  Ambushes are also used to 
prevent supplies from reaching the front and to prevent 
retreating enemy forces from regrouping. 
Raids are another priority for the North Korean Special 
Purpose Forces in this type of campaign.  Special operators 
conduct raids to destroy special weapons such as cruise missiles 
and air defense weapons.  They conduct raids to destroy 
airfields, command and control centers, and ammunition and fuel 
storage sites.  The raid can be used to destroy nearly any part 
of the enemy's infrastructure, or otherwise support the main 
effort of the GPF.69 
Like special reconnaissance missions, sabotage 
operations will likely begin prior to or immediately on 
initiation of hostilities to disrupt the enemy's infrastructure. 
Targets will likely include fuel production and storage, 
telephone networks, power stations, and bulk transportation 
centers.  Sabotage can be direct or indirect.  Direct sabotage is 
68Collins, p. 62 
69Ross S. Kelly, Special Operations and National Purpose, 
(Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1989), p. 80 
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the damaging or destruction of installations, products, and 
supplies.  Indirect sabotage degrades the production processes.70 
Psychological operations (psyops) and subversion also 
are priority missions for these special purpose forces in an 
integrated campaign.  Psyops is the planned use of propaganda and 
actions to influence opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior 
in ways that help accomplish strategic objectives.  Subversion is 
a special form of psyops that undermines morale, discipline, will 
and loyalty of people to their leaders.  These missions use 
propaganda and disinformation to separate individuals from groups 
and groups from each other and society at large.  Apathy, Panic, 
disobedience, desertion, and surrender are command objectives.71 
This subversion differs from the subversion in the 
"autonomist" campaign.  In the "autonomist" model, subversion is 
aimed at coopting active participants from the military.  It goes 
beyond mere psyops and requires actual recruitment. Subversion in 
the "integrationist" model is a form of psyops aimed at both the 
military and civilian population but is not designed to recruit 
active participants. 
Soviet doctrinal concepts also included the use of 
"pseudo" operations.  "Pseudo," or false flag, operations are 
operations conducted in the enemy's uniform and speaking the 
enemy's language.  An example of this was the Nazi use of English 
speaking Germans disguised as American MPs during Battle of the 
70Collins, p. 85 
71Ibid., Pp. 88, 108, 113 
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Bulge in World War II to conduct reconnaissance, sabotage, and 
direct action missions behind Allied lines.  North Korea 
possesses stockpiles of South Korean uniforms and is likely to 
conduct this type of operation.72 
Infiltration is an important aspect of all these 
missions.  "Sleepers" who infiltrate during peacetime, under the 
guise of immigration or tourism, usually from a third country, 
conduct these missions initially.  These "sleepers" appear to 
lead routine lives until they are activated by authorities.  Once 
hostilities break out, special operators will infiltrate by a 
variety of means by land, sea, or air.73 
Many of these missions and targets of this campaign 
seem similar to those of the "autonomist" campaign.  However, 
there are important differences.  On the one hand, operations in 
the "autonomist" campaign are necessarily constrained because the 
main goal is to neutralize the political infrastructure 
temporarily but not to destroy it.  The government that the 
counter-leadership campaign puts in place will need the 
infrastructure to govern.  Also, these operations must at least 
have the appearance of being conducted by forces within the 
target country.  The true nature of the outside support must be 
kept hidden.  Additionally, in the "autonomist" campaign, these 
operations are conducted while trying to keep actual casualties 
to a minimum. 
72Burgess, p. 151 
"Collins, Pp. 88-89 
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On the other hand, operations in the "integrationist" 
campaign are aimed at the destruction of the war-fighting 
infrastructure in order to aid the main conventional war effort. 
These operations are designed to inflict maximum casualties and 
damage on the enemy.  There are no such constraints as found in 
the "autonomist" model. 
45 
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IV. EVALUATION AND PROBABLE CAMPAIGN 
A.   EVALUATION 
An evaluation of North Korea's capabilities and past record 
shows that their special purpose forces were designed to operate 
either autonomously or to be integrated into conventional 
operations.  However, political, military, and economic factors 
point toward North Korea using these special purpose forces 
generally along the lines of the "integrationist" campaign and 
not in a "autonomist" campaign.  There may be some slight 
overlap, however, between the kinds of operations. 
1.   Political Factors 
In the past, North Korean leaders apparently believed that 
an unconventional campaign had a great likelihood of success. 
Evidence in the trial of the two North Korean commandos convicted 
of the Rangoon Bombing suggested that the North was ready to 
infiltrate "thousands" of its unconventional troops into South 
Korea dressed in U.S. and ROK uniforms if the bomb had killed 
president Chun Doo Hwan.74  The political situation was much 
different then.  In 1983, South Korea was under a government that 
came to power through a military coup.  There existed extensive 
domestic unrest in South Korea, as evidenced by the Kwangju 
uprising of May 1981.  An event that began as a student 
demonstration and ended with the military having to retake the 
town of Kwangju by force, killing about 200 civilians in a ten- 
74Denbow, Finta, and Samuels, p. 16 
47 
day period.75  The very legitimacy of the government was in 
question. 
Today's political situation is vastly different.  South 
Korea has made two peaceful transitions of presidents elected by 
popular vote.  The South Korean government is no longer in the 
hands of a few power brokers.  This new government would not be 
easily toppled in a coup-like operation.  This recent rise in 
legitimacy makes it much more difficult to conduct subversion 
operations to the extent needed for an "autonomist" campaign. 
The possibility exists for the North Koreans to pursue an 
"autonomist" strategy if this situation does not match their 
perception of it.  If they still believe that the South Korean 
government is vulnerable to a coup-like operation, they may 
attempt this type of campaign.  However, the liklihood of success 
for an "autonomist" campaign is slim. 
2.   Military Factors 
Several military factors point to the "integrationist" 
campaign. The North Korean doctrine, the defense posture of the 
South, the number and type of forces required for each type of 
campaign, and past successes and failures.  The compexity and 
vulnerability of each also figure into the probable campaign. 
According to North Korean Army defectors, the North's 
strategy calls for a two-front war to neutralize the bulk of U.S. 
and ROK military forces near the Demilitarized Zone, derail the 
South's mobilization and American augmentation effort, isolate 
75Savada and Shaw, p. 55 
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Seoul, and begin peace negotiations all within seven days.76 
This strategy is consistent with the North's theory of three 
revolutions and fits the "integrationist" model.  Operations 
following the "autonomist" model involve a single covert front to 
accomplish the strategic objective.   They are not linked to a 
conventional conflict. 
The South's defense posture has recently been successful at 
intercepting and tracking down infiltrators.  South Korea also 
has extensive security agencies to discover and eradicate any 
"autonomist" type operation.  One can only assume that North 
Korea is aware of this and comes to these logical conclusions. 
Both types of campaigns require large numbers of forces. 
The two major differences are the greater need for security in an 
"autonomist" campaign, and that the forces for this type of 
campaign preferably include subverted forces from the South.  The 
difficulties that the North would encounter in its subversion 
efforts for the "autonomist" campaign would require the 
infiltration of large numbers of agents to have a successful 
campaign.  The larger number of agents infiltrating make security 
nearly impossible.  Smaller numbers could possibly pull off a 
partial success with the assassination of a few key individuals 
in the south.  The results of this partial success would be 
tragic, but, would fall well short of the collapse of the South 
Korean government. 
76Defense Intelligence Agency, Pp. 4-6 
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The biggest success for the North's special purpose forces 
was their ability to tie up significant conventional forces in 
the South prior to the Korean War.  This unconventioal warfare 
campaign, combined with the 1950 invasion, nearly allowed them to 
win the war and was clearly "integrationist." 
The "autonomist" campaign requires the simultaneous 
execution of multiple missions, all of which are critical to the 
success of the campaign.  This makes this campaign extremely 
vulnerable to failure especially with the present political and 
economic situation on the Korean Peninsula.  Failure of just one 
aspect of the "autonomist" campaign can spell failure of the 
entire campaign.  The "integrationaist" campaign has multiple 
missions, but, they are not nearly so interdependent for success. 
Tactical failure of one or even many of the missions involved in 
this campaign still divert enemy forces from the main 
conventional effort.  Thus, contributing to the ultimate success 
of the overall campaign.  The large size of North Korea's Special 
Purpose Forces gives them the ability to absorb the considerable 
losses invoved in operations of this type.   These factors point 
North Korean forces being better suited for a "Integrationist" 
campaign. 
3.   Economics 
The economic development of South Korea has meant rising 
incomes, increased mobility, and increased literacy rate for the 
average South Korean citizen.  This socioeconomic progress also 
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makes successful subversion needed for a "autonomist" campaign 
unlikely and extremely difficult.77 
These factors do not rule out the potential for an 
"autonomist" campaign.  They do, however, point to its likely 
failure.  If North Korean perceptions do not match this analysis, 
or if, in the future, the South Korean government should return 
to the repressive ways of the past, and the North again perceives 
that the South is vulnerable to a coup-like operation, this type 
of campaign becomes more likely. 
B.   PROBABLE CAMPAIGN 
If the North decides again to invade South Korea, the 
strategy of the North Korean army is to fight a two-front war 
aimed at sweeping the peninsula in just 5-7 days.78  The special 
purpose forces play a significant role in this plan.  The 
probable campaign for these forces is based generally on the 
"integrationist" model.  These forces would be used primarily to 
provide intelligence and fight the second front in South Korean 
rear area.  There is a possibility that the North would launch an 
"autonomist" campaign or a hybrid campaign as a deception.  This 
should not be a significant problem for South Korea.  The 
strength of the South's security agencies and the decreased 
suseptability of their government to a coup-like operation 
combine to counter any problems this deception would cause. 
77Savada and Shaw, p. 178 
78General William J Livsey, "Task In Korea: Convince North 
Attack is Futile" Army, October, 1985, p. 135 
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Prior to hostilities, North Korean special purpose forces 
would be infiltrated in small teams to conduct special 
reconnaissance and direct action missions.  To avoid giving away 
the imminent invasion, these teams would primarily be infiltrated 
covertly through a third country to link up with "sleeper" agents 
and begin operations.  Initially, reconnaissance operations would 
be focused on locating missile and weapon storage sites, as well 
as acquisition of other high value targets for future attack. 
They would also be used to gather order of battle data, location, 
size, and disposition of the South Korean armed forces and U.S. 
forces.  These forces would normally operate in a passive mode to 
avoid detection by the South.  They would most likely focus on 
gathering intelligence at a strategic-level of importance.  As 
the impending invasion nears, the focus would shift to more 
tactical types of intelligence targets.  The target acquisition 
would include identifying and targeting key individuals in the 
U.S. and ROK military for assassination, as well as key South 
Korean political figures. 
Direct action operations would call for the insertion of 
small teams by covert means, possibly by waterborne infiltration. 
In a covert only operation, these teams could be expected to 
conduct subversion and sabotage operations to disrupt military 
operations, government operation and day-to-day life in South 
Korea.  Especially vulnerable are the major ports and the lines 
of communication (LOCs) such as railroads and major highways. 
Most South Korean harbors are susceptible to attack or sabotage 
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of locks and heavy cranes.  This equipment is vital for South 
Korean ports to remain functional to receive supplies and 
reinforcements in the event of war.79 The road and rail systems 
have been improved recently but still possess many choke points 
vulnerable to attack.80 
Terrorist operations would likely increase dramatically in 
peacetime.  The North Koreans have shown that they are willing to 
use terror tactics.  It gives them a low risk inexpensive weapon 
to use to further foreign policy.  Likely targets would be U.S. 
troops and family members, South Korean military, and government 
buildings and officials.  They would most likely use bombings, 
kidnapping and assassinations.  Terror tactics usually cost more 
in political capital than they gain in any form.  However, the 
North Koreans have already shown a willingness to use terrorism. 
As a conventional conflict gets closer, terror tactics would 
intensify and then fall off just prior to the invasion. 
Once hostilities begin, these Special Purpose Forces would 
conduct both unconventional and conventional warfare.  Wartime 
operations would consist mainly of special reconnaissance 
operations, wider sabotage operations, raids and ambushes, as 
well as conventional operations.  The benefits of terror would 
likely dwindle with the onset of an invasion. 
Reconnaissance operations would continue but shift to a more 
tactical focus.  They would concentrate on gathering information 
79Denbow, Finta, and Samuels, p. 51 
80Savada and Shaw, Pp. 178-181 
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on troop movements and air operations.  They would observe 
fighter/attack aircraft takeoffs.  Ports, harbors and airfields 
would be watched to collect data on logistics and reinforcements. 
They would also do battle damage assessments. 
Direct action missions would further intensify. 
Infiltration would now expand to the land and air.  These 
guerrilla units would create confusion in the enemy rear areas by 
interdicting reinforcements, ambushing supply convoys, and 
attacking specific enemy defense installations.  These specific 
installations include the Blue House and the headquarters units 
of both the Korean and American commands.81 
Raids can be expected against fixed targets and garrisoned 
troops, and ambushes may be conducted on mobile targets of 
opportunity, both civilian and military.  As hostilities begin, 
massive infiltration of these forces would be accomplished with 
the operational focus turning to support the conventional 
invasion.  They would target command and control centers, 
ammunition storage sites, reinforcements, anything that will 
support the conventional forces. 
The third major element of wartime operations by the Special 
Purpose Forces is the infiltration of light infantry brigade 
units in company to brigade sized elements to conduct 
conventional operations in the enemy's rear area.  These units 
will infiltrate on land by exploring any weak points in the DMZ 
and by using the system of tunnels under the DMZ.  Airborne units 
81
 Jacobs, p. 16 
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can be expected to jump in and amphibious units to be infiltrated 
by sea.  The 250 AN-2/Colts and over 100 Nampo-class fast landing 
craft (hovercraft) provide a significant amount of infiltration 
capability. 
These larger units are specifically charged with creating 
chaos and confusion in the enemy's rear area.  They will conduct 
ranger-type missions to seize and secure key terrain and attack 
key installations (command, control and communications).  They 
will target reinforcements and block potential routes of retreat 
from the DMZ. These units will comprise the second front of the 
North Korean two-front strategy. 
Other light-infantry brigades will fight in a more 
conventional role of direct support for conventional forces. 
They will conduct screening and reconnaissance operations for 
these maneuver units. 
It is important to note that 65 percent of the North Korean 
ground forces are within 5 0 miles of the border and in position 
for attacking.  This gives them the capability of launching an 
invasion with little warning.  This potential for shock and 
surprise, coupled with huge unconventional warfare forces, 
combine to establish a key element in North Korean doctrine. 
This element is the synchronization of shock and unconventional 
warfare operations. 
C.   PEACETIME THREAT 
Several factors may work to motivate the North Korean 
government to intensify its covert operations during peacetime. 
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First, their strategy of long term unconventional warfare to 
infiltrate and subvert the South Korean government since the 
early 1970s has met with little success.  It has failed to create 
that revolutionary force within the south.  Recently, in October 
1992, South Korean authorities rounded up a number of Korean 
Workers Party espionage agents.82 Other factors are the widening 
economic gap between the two countries and a corresponding 
widening gap in the national powers of the north and south.  This 
is further complicated by the north's own international 
isolation. 
Additionally, the "year of national reunification", 1995 has 
arrived.  The possible succession crisis in the North could also 
lead to heightened peacetime operations.  Kim Jong II may resort 
to these type of operations to rally support with hard-liners in 
his own regime or to divert attention away from his internal 
power struggle.  Many analysts have tied the terror tactics of 
the eighties to the younger Kim.  He is said to have masterminded 
the bombing of KAL Flight 858, the Rangoon bombing, and other 
terrorist attacks.83 Finally, the recent collapse of communism in 
the former Soviet Union may make the North Korean government feel 
it has to act to strengthen its own position.  These factors may 
very well serve to motivate the north to turn up the heat on 
covert operations 
82Defense White Paper, p. 57 
83Denbow, Finta, and Samuels, p. 9 
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A more intense peacetime campaign would look much the same 
as operations prior to a conventional war.  It would be composed 
of increased infiltrations to conduct reconnaissance operations, 
guerrilla operations and terrorist operations.  These would look 
much like the same as what has been going on since the early 
1970s, but on a larger scale.  South Korean authorities have been 
very successful at tracking down these units using civil police, 
paramilitary and regular military forces.  However, they have 
only had to deal with these units in very small numbers. 
Reconnaissance operations would be focused on locating 
missile and weapon storage sites, as well as other high value 
targets for future attack.  They would also be used to gather 
order of battle data on the South Korean armed forces and U.S. 
forces.  These forces would normally operate in a passive mode to 
avoid detection by the South.  They would most likely focus on 
gathering intelligence of a strategic-level importance. 
Guerrilla operations would call for the insertion of small 
teams primarily from a third country in peacetime.  In a covert 
only operation, these teams could be expected to conduct 
subversion and sabotage operations that disrupt military 
operations, government operation and day to day life in South 
Korea.  Raids can be expected against fixed targets and 
garrisoned troops, and ambushes may be conducted on mobile 
targets of opportunity, both civilian and military. Terrorism 
would be as discussed above. 
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This scenario, considered with the stated policy goal of 
both North Korea and the Korean Workers party of achieving 
unification amounts to a very real threat.  The United States has 
long-standing treaty obligations with South Korea.  We have 
maintained U.S. troops forward deployed in South Korea as a 
deterrent to war for many years.  How do we continue a credible 
deterrent to conventional war and establish deterrence for 
unconventional operations and terrorism? 
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V.  HOW TO DETER OR COUNTER THE THREAT 
Conventional deterrence theory works on simple cost/benefit 
analysis.  If the cost plus the risk is greater than the expected 
benefit, then deterrence is successful (if C + R > B, then 
peace).  If the cost plus the risk is less than the expected 
benefit, then deterrence will fail (if C + R < B, then conflict). 
To further refine this equation we add the probability of the 
different outcomes.  The probability of failing and therefore 
enduring the costs is inversely proportional to the probability 
of achieving the desired benefit. Therefore, if (P)(C + R) > 
(B)(1-P) then peace, and if (P)(C +R) < (B)(1-P), then 
conflict.84 
This means operationally, that to deter North Korea's use of 
these special purpose forces, South Korea and the United States 
must either raise the cost and risk above the potential benefit, 
or reduce the probability that the North will attain its aims. 
This challenges both the United States and South Korea to develop 
appropriate responses. 
A.   SOUTH KOREAN RESPONSE 
The South Korean response to the threat is simply to prepare 
itself for self defense.  A defense that is strong enough to deny 
the enemy's success will deter him.  This self-defense means 
slightly different things for the three kinds of threat these 
"Alexander L. George and Richard Smoke, Deterrence in American 
Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice, (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1974), p. 60 
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forces pose, conventional invasion, unconventional warfare and 
terrorism in an "integrationist" campaign. 
In the unlikely event of the North launching an "autonomist" 
campaign, South Korea is well prepared to defeat this threat with 
their extensive security agencies.  An additional measure that 
they could consider, is the development of a strike force within 
these existing security agencies tailored to defend against just 
this sort of threat. 
The threat of conventional invasion has been deterred by a 
combined effort of U.S. and South Korean forces since the end of 
the Korean War forty-odd years ago.  To continue this success, 
South Korea has a doctrine of forward defense based on the 
premise that the KPA must not be allowed to reach Seoul.  The 
South should continue to emphasize improving combat 
effectiveness,  strengthening alliance cohesion with the U.S., 
enhancing inter-operability with U. S. forces, and demonstrate 
joint and combined capabilities.  They also need to increase 
vigilance and intelligence gathering to reduce the element of 
surprise that the North could enjoy in launching an attack. 
South Korea also has a pretty good track record when it 
comes to defending against the unconventional threat during 
peacetime.  However, they have not been tested with the numbers 
of infiltrations that would be seen, either in an intense UW 
campaign or as a pre-cursor to an invasion.  In order to deter 
this threat, the south needs to focus on not allowing the 
different types of infiltrations to be successful.  First,  to 
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counter land infiltrations, South Korean and U.S. forces alike 
need to increase vigilance and intelligence gathering.  There is 
also mining and seismographic equipment that may be used to 
locate tunnels along the DMZ.  Second, increased aerial and 
coastal surveillance to counter waterborne infiltration.  The 
South Korean military could also work to enhance relations with 
paramilitary forces, civil authorities and the general population 
to promote better reporting.  South Korea is densely populated. 
Operations in South Korea are extremely difficult to conduct 
without someone detecting you.  There is also a need to increase 
civilian awareness of the threat.  Third, many of these same 
measures will go far to deter the threat of airborne 
infiltration.  Finally, passive measures to reduce the 
vulnerabilities of potential targets should be enhanced. 
A thorough study of the vulnerabilities of important 
facilities would give specific measures to be taken.  Critical 
nodes in these facilities such as the heavy lift cranes, locks, 
and piers in South Korea's ports must be either protected or 
alternate means to accomplish the same function should be 
developed.  An example of this is the development of a logistics 
over the shore (LOTS) equipment as an alternate means in the 
event of harbors and ports being put out of action.  Airport 
security measures must include protection for runway approaches, 
crew billets and vital control  and support facilities. Alternate 
routes should be preplanned around all choke points in the 
South's transportation system (road and rail).  Security at all 
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critical facilities and key industrial complexes could be 
enhanced with the use of electronic security equipment.85 
The third type of threat is more difficult to deter. 
Protection of facilities and people, both Korean and American, 
from terrorism is primarily the responsibility of South Korea. 
Here again,   intelligence gathering is the key to being able to 
defend against terrorism.  It is also necessary to adopt a firm 
policy against terrorism.  If the South Korean authorities, with 
U.S. assistance can deny the benefits of this tactic and convince 
Kim II Sung that terrorism is expensive. 
B.   UNITED STATES RESPONSE 
There are currently roughly 3 6,000 U.S. military personnel 
stationed in Korea.  These forces are there to deter war.  Their 
presence in South Korea makes them available for coalition 
warfare in the event of war, honors our treaty obligations and 
most importantly sends a message of our resolve to North Korea. 
The U.S. response to the threat posed by the North Korean special 
purpose forces should support the South Korean efforts by 
assisting in their effort to deny North Korean infiltrations, 
gather intelligence, and enhance interoperability.  However, our 
main focus should be on establishing a firm policy against 
aggression of any kind by the north.  To accomplish this, the 
U.S. must make its position credible. 
Here are a few ideas on policy alternatives.  First, we need 
to continue our presence on the peninsula at the present level. 
85Denbow, Finta, and Samuels, Pp. 51-53 
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Reductions would give a tacit signal that our resolve is 
weakening.  The United States should also consider deterrence by- 
punishment.  They should explore the use of coercive measures, 
maybe even strikes to punish terrorism as the United States did 
in Libya.  American influence in Japan could be used to cut off 
economic ties with North Korea.  Sino-American relations could be 
tied to the Chinese using what influence they have to deter North 
Korean aggression.  America's global influence  could be used to 
get the international community to condemn North Korea's 
sponsorship of violence and terrorism.  One thing the U.S. should 
not do is make statements about what we will not allow, and then, 
be unprepared to back them up.  These are only a few ideas for 
policy options of the U.S. 
The potential for a crisis in current North Korean 
succession may be the perfect opportunity to try the carrot 
instead of the stick.  The U.S. should explore the option of 
opening diplomatic relations with North Korea.  This would 
facilitate diplomatic negotiations for any future problems that 
arise.  This option may be acceptable to the North as it would 
enhance the legitimacy of Kim Jong II's presidency.  Both China 
and the former Soviet Union established relations with South 
Korea.  A little cross-recognition might be in order. 
C.   CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis has attempted to identify the scope of the 
threat posed by the North Korean Special Forces, how a probable 
North Korean campaign might look and some thoughts on deterring 
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it.  This force of 100,000 men poses a significant peacetime as 
well as wartime threat.  Their operations consist of 
conventional, unconventional and terrorist operations.  It is 
vitally important that both the United States and South Korea 
know as much about this threat as possible in order to formulate 
plans to defend against it and deter it. 
Any conclusions that can be drawn from this research about 
the future use of Special Operations Forces in general must be 
qualified.  The research for this thesis has focused solely on 
the forces of North Korea.  North Korea is probably a unique 
case.  It is undoubtably the most militarized country in the 
world.  It has been a perculiar mix of communism and a 
personality cult united around Kim 11 Sung.  What will emerge 
from the current succession crisis is yet to be seen.  This all 
limits the applicability of any conclusions that can be drawn 
from this case. 
The one conclusion about Special Operations Forces in 
general that can be drawn from this research may be the 
importance of interoperability with conventional forces.  The 
"integrationist" model highlights the value of these forces as 
"force multipliers" when properly integrated in the overall 
strategic campaign.  This integration may be a model for the 
future of Special Operations Forces around the world. 
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APPENDIX: CHRONOLOGICAL LISTING MAJOR NORTH KOREAN OPERATIONS 
(1965-PRESENT) 
1965 
June 13 - Two armed agents in Marine Corps uniform appear near 
Kigok-ri, Wonduck-myun, Samchok-kun, Kangwon-do and attempted to 
abduct civilians to North Korea before being captured alive. 
July 18 - A band of three agents, heavily armed with dynamite, 
submachine guns, pistols, hand grenades and radios, appear near 
Songchu in northwestern outskirts of Seoul with the mission of 
assassinating political leaders.  Two of the intruders are shot 
dead and the third flees. 
September 19 - Two armed agents stab three medicinal herb 
collectors to death on Mt Kumangbong near Changam-ri, Idong-myun, 
Pochon-kun, Kyungggi-do. 
October 8 - Three armed agents ambush and kill two South Korean 
soldiers on Mt. Kodea near Kalmal-myon, Cholwon-kun, Kangwondo. 
October 11 - Four armed agents destroy ten drums of diesel oil 
with hand grenades at the Second Battalion, 23rd Infantry of the 
U.S. Second Division installation. 
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October 24 - Six armed agents break into home of Lt. Colonel Kim 
Tu-pyo near Changpyong-ri, Pangsan-myon, Yangku-kun, Kangwon-do, 
and killed Col. Kim, his two daughters and his sister-in-law. 
Mrs. Kim suffers a serious wound. 
1966 
January 26 - Two North Korean torpedo boats and three speed 
vessels encircle three South Korean fishing vessels off Sokcho 
south of the eastern truce line extension, gun down the skipper 
of a fishing boat and hijack two other boats. 
October 15 - A North Korean patrol unit abducts a South Korean 
solider and raids South Korean troops nine times in fives days 
until October 19 in the mid-eastern front line area. 
October 21 - A South Korean Army food truck is ambushed by North 
Korean troops 500 meters south of the line in the western sector. 
Two South Korean soldiers aboard the vehicle are killed and two 
others wounded. 
November 2 - A group of heavily armed North korean soldiers 
intrude 400 meters south of the Demilitarized Zone and attack 
United Nations Command troops on duty, killing seven of them. 
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November 29 - North Korean gun boats attack a fleet of South 
Korean fishing boats off Kosong on the east coast, and hijack one 
of them. 
1967 
January 19 - North Korean shore batteries shell and sink a South 
Korean naval vessel on duty with South Korean fishing boats south 
of the truce line extension in the eastern sea.  Forty crewmen of 
the sunken ship are killed or wounded. 
February 3 - Squad-strength North Korean troops raid a South 
Korean Army outpost 800 meters south of the Military Demarcation 
Line in the central front line area. 
February 5 - Several North Korean soldiers infiltrate the area of 
a United Nations Command outpost 900 meters south of the Military 
Demarcation Line near Panmunjon. 
March 10 - North Korean troops infiltrate the south of the 
Military Demarcation Line three times. 
March 12 - About 60 to 90 North Korean troops open fire at United 
Nations Command patrols. 
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August 28 - A group of North Korean troops raid an enlisted men's 
dining hall at a U.S. military engineering unit 3 km south of the 
truce line in the western sector.  Two American soldiers and 
KATUSA (Korean Augmentation Troops to U.S. Army) solider are 
killed, and some 2 0 others wounded. 
September 5 - North Korean terrorists blast a train south of 
Chosungri Chongsan-myon, Pochon-kum, Kyonggi-do. 
September 13 - North Korean terrorists blast a train south 600 
meters south of Unjong Station along the Susaek-Munsan line. 
October 6 - North Korean soldiers open fire at a group of 
American soldiers checking water depth along the Imjin river some 
300 meters south of the Military Demarcation Line. 
November 3 - North Korean gun boats attack a fleet of 228 South 
Korean fishing boats south of the truce line extension in the 
eastern sea, abducting 12 fishing boats and their crews. 
December 6 - Three North Korean gunboats abduct 41 South Korean 




January 11 - North Korean attack 2 00 South Korean fishing boats, 
sinking one of them and abducting another with six crewman to the 
north. 
January 21 - Thirty-one commandoes of the North Korean 124th Unit 
infiltrate into Seoul with the mission of raiding Chong Wa Dae. 
In ensuing exchanges of fire, all the intruders excepting one who 
surrenders are shot dead. 
January 23 - Four North Korean patrol boats, supported by two MiG 
planes, hijack U.S.S. Pueblo with 83 crewman aboard on the high 
seas. 
January 25 - About ten North Korean soldiers intrude into the 
U.S. Second Division area in the western sector, killing or 
wounding three KATUSA and 11 American soldiers. 
January 26 - A spokesman for the United Nations Command announces 
that North Korean intruders were repelled in exchanges of fire 
along the truce line four times January 26 and 27. 
April 14 - Five unidentified persons ambush a three-quarter-ton 
truck with seven American and KATUSA soldiers aboard in the U.S. 
Second Division area, killing two American and KATUSA soldiers. 
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April 21 - An eleven-man patrol squad of the 75th Infantry of the 
South Korean 25th Division is ambushed by North Korean soldiers. 
In an ensuing exchange of fire, one of the four South Korean 
soldiers killed and three others wounded.  Three North Korean 
soldiers were also shot dead. 
July 8 - Three unidentified armed persons appear near Wolnong- 
myon, Paju-kun, Kyonggi-do.  Challenged by South Korean troops 
helping farmers transplant rice, the intruders run away as they 
open fire at the challengers.  Two South Korean soldiers are 
wounded. 
July 2 0 - A U.S. Army patrol team is ambushed by an unknown 
number of unidentified persons in the U.S. Second Division area 
near Panchong-ri, Paekhwak-myon, Yonchon-kun, Kyonggi-do.  An 
American officer is killed. 
September 4 - Five unidentified armed persons attack South Korean 
troops on guard duty in the 2 8th Division area near Yangku, 
Kangwon-do, killing two of them and wounding two others. 
September 4 - A truck carrying South Korean troops is ambushed by 
five unidentified armed persons in the 12th Division area near 
Kosung, Kangwon-do.  Four South Korean soldiers are killed and 
another wounded. 
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September 7 - An unknown number of unidentified persons appear in 
the U.S. Second Division area near Paju, Kyonggi-do.  In an 
ensuing exchange of fire, two American soldiers from First 
Battalion, 31st Infantry of the Second Division's Third Brigade 
are killed. 
September 27 - An unknown number of North Korean soldiers appear 
in the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone in the U.S. 
Second Division area near Imjin-myon, Paaju-kun, Kyonggi-do.  Two 
American soldiers are killed in an ensuing engagement. 
October 23 - A patrol team from the 2 8th South Korean Division is 
ambushed by North Korean soldiers in the southern sector of the 
Demilitarized Zone near Yanju, Kyonggi-do.  Three South Korean 
soldiers are killed. 
October 30 - A large number of North Korean guerrillas in eight 
groups of 15 crack troops each from the 124th North Korean Unit, 
land on nearly the same spot along the southern coast in three 
occasions until November 2, and head for different destinations 
for subversive operations.  With the mission of occupying and 
"revolutionalizing" isolated mountainous villages, the intruders 
attempt to indoctrinate villagers with Communist organizations 
and distribute both genuine and counterfeit South Korean currency 
to them.  The guerrillas do not hesitate to kill obedient 
villagers as turncoats or reactionaries. 
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1969 
February 25 - A south Korean naval vessel sights an unidentified 
boat sailing toward the north near Tokchok-do in the western sea. 
On being challenged, the boat opens fire as it crosses the truce 
line extension into the north.  Two crewman of the naval vessel 
are killed and eight others are wounded. 
March 15 - A group of 19 troops from the Fourth Brigade of the 
U.S. Second Division are attacked by North Korean soldiers while 
repairing a Military Demarcation Marker, work which was duly 
announced to the North Koreans beforehand.  One American solider 
is killed and three others are wounded. 
April 15 - A U.S. Navy EC-121 reconnaissance plane with 31 
crewmen aboard is shot down by North Korean fighters on the 
eastern high seas. 
August 17 - An OH-23 helicopter of the U.S. Army 59th Aviation 
Company is shot down by North Korean ground fire during a routine 
training flight near Puksung-ri, Yangsa-myon, Kwanghwa-kun, 
Kyonggi-do.  Three crewmen of the helicopter, which crashed north 
of the truce line, are returned on December 3, 1969. 
September 17 - An unidentified vessel, believed to be a North 
Korean spy boat, opens fire at a police patrol ship and a nearby 
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fishing boat near Shinji-do of Wando-kun, Chollanamdo, sinking 
the police vessel.  Two policemen and one janitor aboard the 
sunken ship are listed as missing.  Two fishermen aboard the 
fishing boat are killed and another wounded. 
September 23 - A North Korean espionage vessel appears in some 2 0 
miles west of Huksan-do in the western sea.  A South Korean naval 
vessel sinks it after a four hour pursuit.  All 15 agents aboard 
the ship are killed.  Six sailors of the naval vessel are also 
wounded in the encounter. 
October 13 - A North Korean espionage vessel infiltrates north of 
Sohuksan-do, Shinan-kun, Cholla-namdo.  A South Korean naval 
ship, assisted by Air Force planes, destroy the fleeing spy boat. 
1970 
April 3 - A South Korean naval ship, on patrol duty in the 
western sea, spots and sinks an infiltrating North Korean spy 
boat southwest of Kyokyolbi-bo. 
June 5 - A South Korean naval vessel, engaged in a psychological 
warfare operation against a fleet of North Korean fishing boats, 
is attacked and hijacked by two North Korean gunboats. 
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June 22 - A North Korean agent attempting to place dynamite at 
the gate of the National Cemetery at Dongjak-dong,  Seoul, dies 
when the explosive goes off accidentally.  Two more agents, 
believed to have been involved in the dynamite setting, elude 
capture. 
June 29 - An unidentified vessel approaching the shore line 500 
yards north of Yonghung-myon, Pochon-kun, Kyonggi-do is captured 
in a joint naval and air force operation.  In a subsequent search 
operation near the shore line area, six intruders are killed on 
Kuksapong Peak, Yonghung-do. 
July 27 - A 50-ton North Korean spy boat infiltrating 11 miles 
northeast of Yongdock, Kyonfsang-pukdo, is detected and sunk in a 
joint naval and air force operation. 
December 5 - Three North Korean intruders appear in the area of 
the 9th company, 3rd Battalion of the 97th Battle Group near 
Tanhyun-myon, Paj-kun, Kyonggi-do.  In an ensuing engagement, a 
South Korean solider is wounded. 
1971 
April 30 - North Korean troops fire about 2 00 machine gun rounds 
at the South Korean fifth Marine Brigade position. 
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May 14 - A North Korean spy boat infiltrates 1.7 miles east of 
Mukho along the east coast.  The boat is sunk and 17 agents 
aboard are killed. 
June 1 - A North Korean spy boat infiltrates 75 miles southwest 
of Sohuksan-do in the western sea.  The 70-ton boat with 15 
agents aboard is sunk in a joint navy-air force operation.  In 
the engagement, a C-46 transport crashes and eight servicemen are 
listed as missing. 
June 16 - Four North Korean agents appear in the 20th Division 
are near Yonchon, Kyonggi-do.  One of the intruders is shot dead. 
August 16 - Five North Korean agents appear in the First Division 
area.  Two of the intruders are killed, and the remaining three 
escape. 
1972 
January 12 - Six intruders appear near a guard post of the U.S. 
Second Division and throws rocks at the GP before fleeing. 
January 16 - Two intruders in black clothes appear some 3 00 
meters west of a United Nations Command checkpoint in the 
southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone. 
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February 4 - Three North Korean patrol boats hijack two South 
Korean fishing vessels 40 miles southwest of Kyukyolbi-do in the 
western sea. 
June 23 - North Korean troops open machine gun fire at a South 
Korean Army post near the truce line. 
March 4 - Several armed agents infiltrate into Woo-do 48 km east 
of Cheju-do and kill a security guard before fleeing. 
March 7 - North Korean troops open fire at a group of South 
Korean soldiers on duty in the southern sector of the 
Demilitarized Zone in the central front line area, killing or 
wounding three of them. 
April 17 - Two North Korean agents infiltrating the southern 
sector of the Demilitarized Zone north of Yonchon,Kyonggi-do are 
shot dead. 
May 5 - Two armed North Korean agents infiltrate Kumdang-do 33 km 
east of Wando-kun, and open fire at and wound a villager. 
November 19 - A North Korean gunboat intrudes into South Korean 
territorial waters east of Paengnyong-do in western sea. 
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December 1 - North Korea claims at a Military Armistice 
Commission meeting that the waters contiguous to the five islands 
in the western sea are its territorial waters. 
December 10 - North Korean gunboats violate the extension of the 
truce in the western sea three times. 
December 18 - Two North Korean gunboats intrude north of 
Sochongdo in the western sea. 
1974 
February 15 - North Korean gunboats attack two unarmed South 
Korean fishing boats on the high seas 48 km west of Paengnyong-do 
in the western sea, sinking one and hijacking the other. 
February 16 - An unknown number of North Korean agents appear on 
the beach at Tongyong, Kyongsang-namdo. 
March 3 - Some 12 0 North Korean guards in the Joint Security Area 
of Panmunjon assault UNC personnel after a North Korean soldier 
was prevented from photographing a ranking UNC general.  Four UNC 
servicemen are injured and four UNC vehicles damaged in the 
assault. 
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April 1 - Four North Korean naval ships intrude south of the 
truce line extension in the western sea. 
May 9 - North Korean troops open fire at a U.S. Army helicopter 
flying south of the Military Demarcation Line. 
May 21 - Three North Korean agents infiltrate into Taeso-ri, 
Chujamyon, Pukcheju-kun.  One intruder is shot dead and the two 
others flee. 
May 21 - Four North Korean naval ships intrude south of the truce 
line extension in the western sea. 
June 28 - Three North Korean gunboats attack a South Korean 
police patrol boat looking after the operation of fishing boats. 
July 1 - A total of eight North Korean naval ships intrude south 
of the truce line extension in the western sea for the seventh 
time since June 25. 
July 2 - A North Korean spy boat infiltrates seven miles 
southeast of Song-do, Pusan.  A South Korean naval vessel 
intercepts and sinks it.  One South Korean seaman is killed and 
three others wounded in the engagement. 
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July 18 - North Korean anti-air batteries open fire at a Korean 
Air line (KAL) plane flying in South Korea air space north of 
Kimpo. 
July 20 - A North Korean spy boat infiltrates west of Ochchong-do 
near Kunsan along the west coast.  The spy boat is sunk in a 
three-hour navy and air force operation. 
August 15 - A Han Min Tong, Pro-North Korean organization in 
Japan, handling agent fired a pistol at President Park Chung-Hee, 
at the ceremony marking the 29th National Liberation, killing the 
First Lady. 
November 15 - The United Nations Command announces the discovery 
of an underground tunnel dug by the North Koreans beneath the 
truce line in the mid-western front line area. 
November 20 - A South Korean Army officer is killed and an 
American officer listed as missing when an explosive goes off in 
the North Korean-dug tunnel in the Demilitarized Zone. 
December 15 - An armed North Korean ship infiltrates 50 miles 
west of Inchon and sinks itself when detected and challenged by a 
South Korean naval vessel. 
1975 
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February 15 - A North Korean spy boat, disguised as a fishing 
vessel, infiltrates 3 miles east of Kojin, Kangwon-do.  The boat 
is sunk and a crewman captured alive. 
February 26 - Ten North Korean vessels intrude 23 miles southwest 
of Paengnyong-do in the western sea.  One of them is sunk and 
nine others flee. 
March 20 - The United Nations Command announces the discovery of 
the second North Korean tunnel beneath the truce line, and lodges 
a protest with the North Korean against the tunnel digging at a 
meeting of the Military Armistice Commission. 
March 21 - Two North Korean Defectors - Kim Pu-sung assigned to 
the Workers' (Communist) Party Liaison Department and Yu Daeyun, 
a North Korean lieutenant - reveal that North Korea is digging 
tunnels across the truce line for invasion or infiltration 
routes. 
April 29 - Two armed North Korean agents appear near Sokdae-dong, 
Pusan.  One of the pair is caught on the same day in Pusan and 
the other in Seoul on May 3. 
June 9 - Two North Korean MiG fighters intrude over Paengnyong-do 
in the western sea. 
80 
June 3 0 - Four or five North Korean guards assault a UNC security 
officer, Maj. William Henderson, and inflict serious injuries. 
July 12 - A North Korean vessel infiltrates 2 0 miles northwest of 
Paengnyong-do in the western sea.  When challenged by a South 
Korean gunboat, it flees to the north escorted by North Korean 
naval vessels which violated the truce line extension to come to 
its rescue. 
August 2 6 - Two armed North Korean agents intrude near the 
Freedom Village in the southern sector of the Demilitarized Zone, 
and kidnapped one of its villagers. 
September 11 - Several North Korean agents appear on the beach at 
Sangha-muon, Kochang-kun, Cholla-pukdo.  One of the infiltrators 
is shot dead. 
October 6 - A North Korean spy boat approaching a beach some 2 0 
miles west of Taehuksan-do, Shinan-kun, Cholla-namdo is 
intercepted and sunk. 
1976 
January 23 - Two Korean warplanes intrude over Paengnyong-do in 
the western sea. 
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April 7 - Two North Korean tanks intrude into the southern sector 
of the Demilitarized Zone. 
June 19 - Three North Korean agents infiltrate a South Korean 
army area in the mid-eastern front line area.  All of them are 
shot dead. 
August 5 - A North Korean outpost shells a South Korean outpost 
across the Military Demarcation Line. 
August 18 - About 3 0 axe and club wielding North Korean guards 
attack a group of UNC personnel supervising a tree pruning by 
workers in the Joint Security Area of Panmunjom, killing two 
American officers and injuring five KATUSA and four American 
servicemen. 
1977 
June 3 - North Korean troops infiltrating the southern boundary 
of the Demilitarized Zone attack two South Korean patrols, 
killing one and wounding another. 
July 14 - North Korean troops open fire at and bring down a U.S. 
Army CH-47 helicopter which crossed the Military Demarcation Line 
due to a navigational error.  Of the four crewmen, three were 
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killed and the other injured.  The dead and injured are turned, 
over to UNC through Panmunjom two days later. 
October 2 0 - North Korean troops kidnap a South Korean battalion 
commander and his signal man.  The officer was supervising the 
routine repair of a demarcation marker in the Demilitarized Zone. 
1978 
April 28 - A North Korean speed boat escorting infiltrating 
agents is intercepted and sunk near Komun-do, Namhae-kun.  In the 
engagement, four crewmen of the North Korean ship are killed. 
One South Korean seaman is killed and four others are wounded. 
October 27 - The United Nations Command announces the discovery 
of the third North Korean tunnel beneath the truce line 4 km 
southwest of Panmunjom. 
November 27 - Three North Korean agents infiltrate the south and 
kill four civilians 
1979 
July 21 - A North Korean armed spy boat is intercepted and sunk 
near Pojo-Do, Namhai-kun, six agents aboard are killed. 
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August 9 - National police smash 24-man spy ring operating in 
Samchok (east coast) 
September 6 - North Korean agents attempt, but fail to kidnap 
three South Korean engineers in Pakistan 
1980 
January 26 - North Korean navy kidnap South Korean fishing boat 
Haewang-ho Nos. 6 and 7 at the high seas. 
March 23 - Three North Korean armed agents are shot dead while 
infiltrating across the Han River. 
March 25 - An infiltrating North Korean armed spy boat is sunk 
off Pohang. 
March 27 - Three North Korean armed agents intrude 600 meters 
south of the Military Demarcation Line in the area of Kumhwa, 
Kangwo-do and fire on ROK soldiers killing one and wounding 
another. 
June 21 - A North Korean spy ship intrudes into the west coast 
(Sosan).  Of nine armed agents aboard, eight killed and one 
captured alive. 
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July 23 - Failed North Korean kidnapping attempt on a South 
Korean delegate to United Nations woman's conference in 
Copenhagen, Denmark. 
September 8 - North Korean navy kidnaps a South Korean fishing 
boat, Namjin-ho. 
November 3 - Unidentified number of North Korean armed agents 
infiltrates Hwengan-do, Wando-kun, in the southwestern sea. 
Three are killed. 
December 2 - North Korean navy kidnaps South Korean Fishing boat, 
Taechang-ho on high seas. 
December 2 - two of three North Korean infiltrators killed 
attempting to land at Mijo-ri, southern tip of Namhae island. 
1981 
August 12 - Two North Korean MiG-21 planes, protected by about 10 
fighters, infiltrate the air space of the Republic of Korea. 
August 2 6 - North Korea fires an SA-2 surface-to-air missile at a 
U.S. SR-71 reconnaissance plane. 
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October 31 - North Korean troops open about 62 0 rounds of rifle 
and machine gun fire across the Military Demarcation Line in the 
28th Division area. 
1982 
April 21 - North Korean troops fire about 100 rounds of 82 mm 
recoilless guns in the Demilitarized Zone 2 6 km north of Hwachon 
in the central sector. 
May 15 - Two armed North Korean agents appear Kosung-kun, 
Kangwon-do, one shot dead. 
June 7 - North Korean troops fire at a South Korean guard post 8 
km northwest of Kojin in the eastern sector for eight minutes. 
July 13 - A North Korean patrol boat hijacks "Masan-ho No. 5" and 
its crewmen engaged in fishing on eastern high seas. 
1983 
June 19 - ROK military intercept and kill three armed North 
Koreans infiltrating into the south. 
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October 9 - Four South Korean Ministers and twelve others die in 
bomb blast in Rangoon, Burma. South Korean president survives 
only because he arrived late. 
December 3 - Two armed North Korean infiltrators captured near 
Pus an 
1984 
April 2 - Two South Koreans, Choi Eunhee and Shin Sanuok 
kidnapped by North Korean agents. 
1985 
October 2 0 - ROK Navy sinks North Korean Spy boat off the coast 
near Pusan. 
1986 
February 1-5 - Do Choe-Sung, 2nd Secretary of ROK embassy in 
Beirut is kidnapped, suspected ties to North Korea. 
September 14 - A terrorist bomb explodes in Kimpo International 
Airport, suspected ties to North Korea. 
1987 
87 
November 29 - KAL flight 858 from Baghdad to Seoul explodes, bomb 
planted by two North Korean agents. 
1992 
May 22 - Three North Korean infiltrators killed attempting to 
cross DMZ southern sector. 
October 6 - North Korean spy ring rounded up, Worker's 
(Communist) Party of Korea. 
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